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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Before The Honorable Charles R. Breyer, Judge

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

VS. NO. CR 16-00462 CRB

SUSHOVAN TAREQUE HUSSAIN,

Defendant.

San Francisco, California Friday, February 23, 2018

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff:

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For Defendant:

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Reported By: Jo Ann Bryce, CSR No. 3321, RMR, CRR, FCRR

Official Reporter

Friday - February 23, 2018 1 10:39 a.m. 2 PROCEEDINGS ---000---3 Calling criminal action CR 16-0462, U.S.A. THE CLERK: 4 5 versus Sushovan Tareque Hussain. 6 Counsel, please state your appearances. MR. REEVES: Adam Reeves and William Frentzen for the 7 United States. Good morning, Your Honor. 8 THE COURT: Good morning. 9 MR. KEKER: Good morning, Your Honor. John Keker, 10 11 Jan Little, and Brook Dooley for Mr. Hussain, who is present. THE COURT: Right. Good morning. 12 So this matter is on for trial obviously on Monday and it 13 will proceed on Monday. 14 15 The Court has received two communications, and one I want 16 to -- and I'd like to address them -- from jurors; is that 17 right? 18 THE CLERK: Yes. THE COURT: One communication -- and I should -- would 19 20 you hand this to counsel so they can take a look at this? 21 THE CLERK: Yes. THE COURT: Let's take a look at the -- one is from 22 Mr. Yencer, and I will deal with Ms. Humphrey in a minute. 23 (Pause in proceedings.) 24 25 THE COURT: I would point out that in Mr. Yencer's

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questionnaire he does point out that it's a hardship for the reasons essentially the doctor states, but let's deal with it globally, meaning here's the next one. The next one is from Ms. Humphrey, who has a letter from her doctor, which says that -- I'm sorry, the letter is from the doctor, the nurse practitioner. The juror is named Botto and the letter reads (reading): "Ms. Botto is prequant with a due date of August 21st. She's planning to breastfeed her child. Please allow her to defer her jury duty until after she has delivered and then weaned her baby." I mean, give me a break. I can promise her -- right? -that she will complete her jury duty well before the due date, I mean well before the due date. That's not a problem. So I'm not excusing her unless you see some overriding reason why I should. MR. KEKER: We don't. MR. REEVES: I agree, Your Honor. Okay. THE COURT: Yeah. So that takes us back to Do you have any views of Mr. Yencer? Mr. Yencer. We don't object to excusing him, MR. KEKER: Your Honor. I think I really should excuse him. THE COURT: mean, I feel I should excuse him. You know, again, it's not

a -- I can force him to be here, but it would be forcing him to

I mean, I think it's legitimate. What I'm saying is 1 be here. I think that's a legitimate reason. 2 MR. KEKER: Sounds like it. 3 And had I thought about it probably with THE COURT: 4 5 greater care, I would have excused him. 6 MR. REEVES: We agree, Your Honor. I didn't think about it with enough care. 7 THE COURT: But, you know, usually what you have to do -- or not usually, 8 but sometimes in these cases you actually have to sort of test 9 10 how firm their resolve is not to serve on a jury. The only 11 people who really succeed in that, of course, are lawyers because they know how firm they can be, as one has already been 12 13 excused. So I would grant the request absent an objection. 14 MR. REEVES: No objection, Your Honor. 15 16 MR. KEKER: We have no objection, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: Do you have the jury list? 18 THE CLERK: Yes. Let me bring one thing to the attention of 19 THE COURT: 20 the parties that I now realize I should have mentioned. 21 It turns out that I know one of the jurors, who I'm not 22 going to identify. I know one of the jurors in a very remote 23 I knew a person that he was associated with, and I think that on one occasion in the last 15 to 20 years I may have gone 24

to his house; but my relationship was, again, through my wife,

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through a friend, and I didn't recognize this juror and the name meant nothing but looking at it, I now recognize the name.

I don't think that's a basis for excusing this juror. I'm not telling you the juror's name because I don't know that that makes any difference. You can convince me -- I don't want to keep it a secret, but I don't know that it makes any difference to your determination as to whether it creates a problem. I quess arguably it could.

But I think as soon as I identify this juror -- who I, again, wouldn't recognize today having met him on one occasion -- I can say "him" because it's halfway, six men, six women, something like that -- so I'm -- but if you want me to handle it differently, I will.

MR. KEKER: I think it just puts all the more pressure on you to not lean one way or the other, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I never feel any pressure like that.

I mean, I just --

MR. KEKER: That's fine.

THE COURT: I just thought that, you know, this is going to be a long trial. It's an important trial. People are devoting tremendous resources on both sides to the trial, and I just want to make sure that there isn't some sort of undisclosed issue.

MR. KEKER: We appreciate it, and we don't have any objection to that situation, Your Honor.

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              MR. REEVES:
                           The Government appreciates it too,
     Your Honor. And I'd note that the juror didn't seem to
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     indicate a --
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              THE COURT: I don't even know if that juror knows
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     me -- I mean, whether that juror actually remembers that we
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           I don't know. It's not that I heard from that juror.
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              MR. REEVES: So I think on this record that it would
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    be fine to continue to proceed with this juror, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT:
                          Okay. All right. If it turns out to be a
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    problem, then it turns out to be a problem.
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          Okay.
                 So now we're starting with -- we're down -- we're
     down two?
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              MS. LITTLE: Four alternates.
              THE COURT: So we're starting with now four
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                  We'll see how far we get. In the Shrimp Boy case,
     alternates.
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     we were down to no alternates.
              MR. FRENTZEN: We came close. I think that's right,
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     Your Honor.
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              THE COURT:
                          We came very close.
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              MR. FRENTZEN:
                             Yeah.
              THE COURT: We didn't have to go to the rule of 11.
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     You know, there's that rule that says once the jury starts its
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     deliberations, you can proceed with 11 with good cause but you
     can't before. I don't know whether you can by stipulation.
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     From my recollection, there's some case out there that talks
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about stipulating to fewer than 12 jurors, but let's hopefully not get to that point.

Okay. So those are the sort of things that I wanted to just bring to your attention. Anything you want to bring to my attention?

MR. REEVES: Nothing for the Government, Your Honor.

MR. KEKER: Yes, Your Honor. We want to talk -- you just mentioned stipulations. We want to talk about a stipulation that we're having a great deal of difficulty with the Government with, and Ms. Little is going to address it.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. LITTLE: Your Honor, the most relevant documents in this case are documents that were created at Autonomy obviously and were produced by Hewlett Packard to the Government and then in turn the Government produced them to us. I think there's, like, 2 million documents that came from Hewlett Packard to us is what I've been told, and largely those are Autonomy documents. A large number of exhibits in this case are going to be Autonomy documents.

We have been trying since last spring to reach a stipulation with the Government that documents produced by Hewlett Packard to the Government and then on to us can be presumed authentic under Rule 901 so we don't have to have some kind of fight about authenticity.

The Government has not been willing to enter into such a

stipulation. Initially Mr. Reeves' position was that he wanted to see the exact documents we were talking about. We said, "We don't want -- a lot of these are cross-examination documents.

We don't want to give you a preview of our cross-examination."

And we have no reason to think that any of these documents are not authentic. And, in fact, we asked Mr. Reeves, "If there are particular documents that you have a problem with that you think are somehow authentic, let's hear about it."

Mr. Reeves could not identify any.

We sent the stipulation to the Government again last week, and again the Government is not willing to stipulate to the authenticity of these documents produced by HP; and now the Government is suggesting that there may be some issue about the provenance of documents or their authenticity, whether they've been altered in some way. So we don't want to have a 104 hearing on every document in this case.

THE COURT: No. No, I'm not interested in hearing what the rationale is.

As I understand it, the argument simply is if Hewlett Packard produced the document, it then is authenticated for purposes of its -- basically of its origin; that is to say, this document came from the files of Hewlett Packard. That would be the stipulation, or kept in the ordinary course of -- well, I don't know about that.

I mean, if X sends a document to Hewlett Packard, so a

letter, as an example, Jones sends a letter to Hewlett Packard about the Autonomy transaction, whatever it says, and Hewlett Packard then has produced this or given it to the Government and the Government has turned around and given it to you, you say, "Look, I want to include that document that it's authentic."

MS. LITTLE: It is what it purports to be.

THE COURT: It is what it purports to be, which is a letter from Jones that was sent to Hewlett Packard period. End of stipulation.

MS. LITTLE: And actually the stipulation also had a clause that we proposed that said "Any party, you know, has the option if there is a serious issue, that can be contested."

You know, there's a carve-out if there's an issue.

THE COURT: There's a carve-out. So, in other words, if suddenly you get to something and it seems that, notwithstanding the fact that it was a letter that would come from -- that came from Hewlett Packard, it was inserted in the files of Hewlett Packard by somebody other than somebody conducting in the ordinary course of business. It's let's sort of put in a poison pill or something that is inauthentic. Like now let's put in -- an example might be a balance sheet where suddenly somebody sends for some reason or another a balance sheet, a statement of assets, whatever it is, to Hewlett -- or Hewlett Packard comes across this because somebody sent it to

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them, and they sent it to them for the purpose of, let's take
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     the worst case, sort of inserting it in the litigation to say,
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     "Ah ha, Hewlett Packard knew about this all the time.
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     Look at its files. It had this. It had this information."
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              MS. LITTLE: To our knowledge, there's no such --
              THE COURT: Well, no, I'm making it up. Obviously I'm
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 7
    making it up.
          I'm trying to figure out the Government's position
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    because, as I understand the proposal, is that would be carved
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           If there's some reason to believe that this document is
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     out.
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     other than what it purports to be, that will be the subject of
     a separate inquiry.
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              MS. LITTLE: I can show you the --
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                          So you wouldn't be authenticating that.
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              THE COURT:
              MS. LITTLE: I can show you the proposed stipulation
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     if you like.
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              THE COURT:
                          Okay.
              MR. REEVES: Do you have a second copy?
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              THE COURT:
                          Okay. So let's try to understand what the
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     Government's position is. Let me take a moment and read it.
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                         (Pause in proceedings.)
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              THE COURT: So what's wrong with this? Mr. Reeves,
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     what's wrong with this stipulation?
              MR. REEVES: Well, there are a number of things that
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     are wrong with it, Your Honor.
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THE COURT: Okay. Let's start with the first.

MR. REEVES: Okay. I think the Court has immediately identified conceptually one to have the major problems here, which is that Hewlett Packard comes into the possession of all kinds of documents that may or may not be authentic.

What Hewlett Packard or a custodian could say is that we had it in our files and gave it to the Government. That, I'm not certain, is the same thing as authenticating all documents. So that's point number one.

THE COURT: Well, wait, let's start with point number one because I'm not quite sure I understand point number one.

Why isn't point number one addressed by paragraph two of the stipulation?

It says, "Notwithstanding the presumption" -- it's a presumption that it was authentic -- it's authentic -- "a party against whom a document is offered, may introduce affirmative evidence that the document is not authentic."

Now, you say, "Oh, but that puts the burden on the Government to do that," and isn't the burden always on the Government to do that? I mean, how is it not?

MR. REEVES: I'm not sure that's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. You're saying it's not correct because if the Defense offers a document, the burden is on them to show that it's authentic? All they want to do is say, if I understand them correctly, this piece of paper came out of the

files of Hewlett Packard. That's actually true. You don't deny that, do you?

MR. REEVES: We would stipulate to that.

THE COURT: Pardon?

MR. REEVES: I'm not sure that makes all documents authentic. I'm happy to stipulate that X documents came from Hewlett Packard. That does not, in my judgment, satisfy the authenticity requirements of the rule, Your Honor.

And I think there's a -- so if I can expand on this a little bit.

THE COURT: No, go ahead. Go ahead.

MR. REEVES: Starting at the beginning, I disagree with counsel's characterization of this negotiation.

THE COURT: I don't care about the characterization.

Look, I am so beyond characterizations that you don't have

to -- you don't have to respond to the characterization. I'm

not accepting the characterization. I'm looking at something

and saying, is this a good idea from a trial point of view? Is

this going to save time? Is it going to reduce the number of

witnesses or is it not? I don't care who proposed it, who

rejects it, who accepts it. None of those things matter.

This is personality neutral. It's advocacy neutral. It's a big zone of everybody's great and I just want to get the idea of what we're doing here.

MR. REEVES: I don't think it's going to save any

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I don't see a reason why this case should be different
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     time.
     from any other case. I've asked for examples of a so-called
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    blanket stipulation in the past. They have not provided one,
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     and I'm not aware of one.
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              THE COURT: Well, I'll tell you one reason.
                                                           There are
     2 million reasons why this case is different from every other
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            I don't have a case in which there generally are
     2 million documents that I have to deal with. So this is
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     different.
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          You know, like it matters, that matters, and I'm just
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     looking at something and trying to figure out is there a
     reason, is there a reason, a good reason, or even a bad reason
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     why we shouldn't have an acknowledgment by the Government that
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     these documents were at least -- well, you're saying you're
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     willing to agree that they came from the files of
     Hewlett Packard. What you're not willing to do is for the
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    purposes of 902 or 903 --
              MS. LITTLE: 901 simply says that, you know, a
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     document is what it purports to be.
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              MR. REEVES: But that's the issue. We're willing to
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     stipulate that we got the documents from Hewlett Packard.
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     Whether it is what it purports to be is an open question.
23
     do I mean by that?
              THE COURT: Yeah, what do you mean by that?
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              MR. REEVES: I mean that there is clear evidence in
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our investigation of an effort to possibly destroy or obtain certain of the Autonomy documents. So that -- I think the Autonomy documents as a subset of the overall documents produced by HP, we have some questions about their blanket reliability. We'll be introducing --

THE COURT: Well, authentication doesn't say whether they're reliable or not, does it? It just says that they are what they -- they are -- can't you have a false document that is otherwise authenticated?

In other words, if I go -- let's say I'm a defendant and I create a false balance sheet. Is that not authenticated if it comes from files X? It is a balance sheet. Whether it's true, when it was obtained, how it was produced all are questions that may go to the document, but I don't know that it goes to anything further than what weight to give to the document or maybe even admissibility.

This doesn't -- this doesn't say they're admissible. This simply says that they don't have to bring in Hewlett Packard to say that they came from Hewlett Packard. You say you're willing to agree to that.

MR. REEVES: Okay. I've seen this play out in this courtroom in other cases in a very routine way where any number of documents that the witnesses have some exposure to or some familiarity to, even if there are questions, are received into evidence, are subject to the testimony, and I see no reason why

that can't be precisely the process that we follow here.

What I am concerned about is the introduction or the use of documents that don't have sponsoring witnesses, that don't have any connection to the trial testimony, and that can create real problems.

So a stipulation like this begins to invite sort of the introduction of documents that have no context, and I'm not exactly certain how or when or where that would happen, but I see this as a -- essentially as a mechanism for eventually introducing documents that are disconnected to the testimony of the trial. And --

THE COURT: Are you willing to concede that if a document -- if a witness gets up or the lawyer gets up and says, "Here is Exhibit 602. This document comes from the files of Hewlett Packard," are you willing to concede that that's done? You'll stipulate to that?

MR. REEVES: I will stipulate that the documents we got from Hewlett Packard we got from Hewlett Packard.

THE COURT: Ah, okay. You're not conceding its admissibility. You're just saying they don't have to come in and bring somebody from Hewlett Packard.

MR. REEVES: They don't have to do that, Your Honor. Will that solve the problem?

THE COURT: If that's as good as it gets, that's fine.

I think that's what it says, by the way.

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              MS. LITTLE:
                           Yeah.
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              THE COURT:
                          So, I mean --
              MR. REEVES: We will modify it to make certain it says
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     that, but we will stipulate to that, Your Honor.
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              MS. LITTLE: Good.
                                  I think that should take care of
 6
     it.
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              THE COURT:
                          Thank you.
          Okay. Any other problems?
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              MR. REEVES: Nothing for the Government.
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          I had one question -- oh, I'm sorry.
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              MR. DOOLEY: We have another issue -- a couple of
     issues.
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              THE COURT:
                         Do you want to address your question?
              MR. REEVES: It's about scheduling. It can wait until
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15
     the end.
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              THE COURT: All right. Let's wait.
              MR. DOOLEY: One witness question, Your Honor.
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     most recent witness list filed by the Government, they identify
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     a, quote/unquote, F.R.C. witness, which I take to be a witness
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     from the Financial Reporting Council in England, but they've
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    not identified the name of the witness and we've asked about
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     that, and we'd like to ask again in this context the specific
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    name of the F.R.C. witness that the Government intends to call.
              MR. REEVES: We don't have the name yet, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: You don't have the name of the person?
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MR. REEVES: No. We have been in dialogue with the lawyers.

THE COURT: When will you know this person?

MR. REEVES: We've asked for it repeatedly at this point, but I don't know. I'm hopeful that we'll know it soon; and as soon as we know it, I'm happy to convey it to counsel.

MR. DOOLEY: That's fine, Your Honor.

MR. KEKER: Your Honor, I wanted to raise, not for you to do anything about it today necessarily, but just to alert you to what I see as a problem in the evidence as we go forward; and that is, the Government has identified in Docket Number 71, 13 people that it claims are co-conspirators in the conspiracy charged in the Indictment. We challenge that there is a conspiracy. We challenge that these people are co-conspirators. We challenge the whole thing.

When somebody gets up and we say "hearsay" as an objection and they say "co-conspirator exception," then that's going to raise a host of issues.

I mean, one is does this person properly belong even in the conspiracy that they think they're proving? Because we think some of the people are completely absurd.

And then, second, what conspiracy are they talking about that this person might -- anyway, all those foundational issues. And I just wanted to raise them with you because I think that's going to come up.

THE COURT: Well, I'm sure it's going to come up because it comes up in any basically large-scale trial, and what judges traditionally do is they allow it in subject to a motion to strike.

I don't see why I would do it any differently here. I understand that -- unless I see -- you know, unless it's clear at the outset, there simply isn't a conspiracy here and there's no way they can prove a conspiracy. I mean, that can happen. The Government can charge anything and that can happen.

But absent that, I don't think I would force them to prove the conspiracy in advance of allowing the statement to be received into evidence because it becomes an impossible sort of chicken-and-egg very, very difficult situation to deal with.

MR. KEKER: And we anticipate --

THE COURT: I actually think you sort of preserve your argument anyway given -- you know, given how the case unfolds. I mean, if the case unfolds and it becomes clear to the Court that there is no there there, which is your argument, then the Court considers, you know, what, if anything, should be done with respect to any or all of the statements that are admitted.

Putting it another way, while I would understand that a defendant would prefer the former rather than the latter, the benefit the defendant gets from that -- from the way that at least I perceive, is that by a failure of proof, they jeopardize the entire case.

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You see, because it can happen, and I think it has happened in cases that I've had over 21 years now where I simply look at it and say that the case is fatally infected by the statement. You can't really unring -- you can unring a number of bells but you can't unring the carillon. I mean, if you have enough bells going off, you're not going to -- you're going to be -- it's going to become very difficult to unwind the situation. So that's the risk the Government's at. Now, you know, like, hey, nothing's perfect. You know, I'm sorry but trials are imperfect things and there has to be somebody going first and second, so I don't -- I mean, I'm glad you raised it, but I want to reduce your expectations, if you have them --And I appreciate --MR. KEKER: -- and I'm not saying don't object. THE COURT: just saying --MR. KEKER: Because we have to. THE COURT: I think you have to. MR. KEKER: I think we have to. And I quess what I wanted to say is that this is -- I mean, if it's a drug case, then everything they're talking about is about drugs and it's all illegal, and so on. This is -- their position is that the entire business -- I mean, that their business at Autonomy was part of the

conspiracy. So they have 13 people and they're going to say

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everything that they said comes in under the co-conspirator's
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     exception, and I think that raises issues that are unique to
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     this case.
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              THE COURT: We going to have a daily?
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              MS. LITTLE: Yes.
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              MR. KEKER: Are we going to have dailies?
              MS. LITTLE: Yes.
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              MR. KEKER: Yes.
 8
                         Okay. So that helps.
              THE COURT:
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              MR. KEKER: That's all that I had, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Reeves?
              MR. REEVES: I just had one inquiry if I could.
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              THE COURT:
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                          Sure.
              MR. REEVES: The Court has indicated that on
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     Wednesday, March 28th, it intends to be dark that day.
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              THE COURT: March 28th.
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              MR. REEVES: March 28th. And as we sort of
18
     anticipate --
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              THE COURT:
                          That's a month from now.
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              MR. REEVES: It is a month from now, but we have a lot
21
     of travel and scheduling that we've been --
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              THE COURT: Why did I say I'm not going to be here on
    March 28th, is that your question?
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              MR. REEVES: That is my question. Thank you,
     Your Honor.
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Why am I not going to be here, Lashanda,
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              THE COURT:
     on March 28th?
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                         On the 28th --
              THE CLERK:
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              THE COURT: Is it Che Pastora day? What is it?
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              THE CLERK: CSAG meeting in Washington, D. C., and
     JPML in Atlanta.
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 7
              THE COURT:
                          There we are.
              MR. REEVES: You'll be traveling?
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                          I'll be on the road doing the road thing.
 9
              THE COURT:
              MR. REEVES: Thank you, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT:
                          I've got to do the -- I've got to do those
     things.
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              MR. REEVES: I'm glad to hear that. I hope you have a
    nice trip, and we'll plan accordingly.
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              THE COURT: I doubt if I'll have a nice trip.
     I may have a nice trip.
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17
              MR. REEVES: Thank you.
              THE COURT:
                          Okay. Anything else?
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                         No, Your Honor.
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              MR. KEKER:
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              MR. REEVES: Nothing for us. Thank you.
              THE COURT: All right. So I just have to figure out
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     should I excuse -- I think it would be a good idea for me to
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23
     excuse that juror that's got the financial issues.
                         Yes, Your Honor, Mr. Yencer.
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              MR. KEKER:
              THE COURT: Just notify him --
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             MR. REEVES: Mr. Yencer, yes.
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              THE COURT:
                        -- so he doesn't show up.
              THE CLERK:
                         Yes.
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              THE COURT: And we'll just proceed. Better not to
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 5
     tell the jurors there's a way out; right? No exit. Sartre.
 6
     That's it. Nobody can get out of this. We're in the eighth
 7
     circle of something.
             MR. REEVES: You'd like us here at 8:45 on the trial
 8
 9
     days?
              THE COURT: I'd like that, but it's not -- I mean, I
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     won't be here until 9:00.
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             MR. REEVES: We'll be here at 8:45, Your Honor.
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13
             MR. KEKER:
                         Thank you, Your Honor. See you Monday.
              THE COURT: See you Monday. Looking forward to it. I
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15
     am really looking forward to this case. I think it's going to
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    be interesting, isn't it? You-all promise -- I mean, how
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     you're going to keep this alive for the jury, you know --
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             MR. REEVES: That's why we have Mr. Frentzen.
              THE COURT:
                         Pardon? Okay. Great.
                                                  Well, we have good
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     lawyers on both sides, and it should be really interesting.
21
     I'm looking forward to it. So thank you.
22
                          Thank you, Your Honor.
              MR. KEKER:
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             MR. REEVES: Thank you, Your Honor.
                            Thank you, Your Honor.
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             MR. FRENTZEN:
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              THE COURT: Thank you for being here.
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(Proceedings adjourned at 11:08 a.m.) ---000---CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter. Wednesday, April 18, 2018 DATE: g andergen Jo Ann Bryce, CSR No. 3321, RMR, CRR, FCRR U.S. Court Reporter